METAPHYSICS AND MATERIAL NECESSITY
abstract
If metaphysics were possible, its critics claim, it would have to draw its subjet matter illegitimately either from established empirical sciences, or from purely formal disciplines like logic and mathematics, or else claim a privileged access to "unseen" entities. This paper argues that a fourth class of subject matter is possible, characterized by a transcendental standpoint (thus distinguishing it from empirical science), and yet still non-formal and empirical. This distinctgive subject mater is tied to what is here referred to as material necessity--a concept which in fact is to be found both at the heart of the development of classical metaphysics (Parmenides, Plato Aristotle) as well as in its modern criticism (Hume, Kant, Hegel). The paper concludes with a criticism of idealistic metaphysics (especially Hegel) for assuming the empiricist position that no subject mater can be both transcendental and empirical.