Of Two Minds: The Nature of Inquiry
abstract
This book proposes a resolution of the paradox of inquiry, originally formulated in Plato's
Meno and most recently the focus of the "logic of discovery" debate in the philosophy of
science. The theory of correction developed here directly opposes the claim made by
evolutionary epistemologists like Popper and Campbell that there is no such thing as a "logical method
for having new ideas." While this logic is perhaps more easily detected in scientific discovery, it is
to be found wherever cognition pushes at the limits of its existing categories--especially in that most
intimate form of inquiry in which we attempt to articulate meanings for ourselves. To provide this
broader application, the author develops substantially new interpretations of the nature of ampliative
inference, representation and meaning, classical dialectic, the heuristic role of models and metaphors,
and the role of inquiry in the constitution of human consciousness. This comprehensive and
revolutionary theory also challenges traditional epistemology's conception of justification by arguing
that the constitution of knowledge is only intelligible within the context of inquiry.
PART I develops a logic of scientific discovery, arguing that new hypotheses are generated by editing
or correcting antecedent hypotheses in response to empirical discrepancies. Correction and the
mapping it utilizes rely on a form of inference which is simultaneously logically non-ampliative
(deductive) and epistemically ampliative. Two different correction procedures are required, supporting
a notion of reciprocal justification distinct from the perspectives of foundationalism and the coherence
theory. This correction theory is situated among both its friendly (Nickles, Peirce/Hanson, Simon)
and unfriendly (Popper, Campbell) neighbors.
PART II outlines a theory of representation (focusing on the analog-digital distinction) that can serve
as a bridge to a more general theory of inquiry. The articulation of meaning, like the scientific
explanation of natural phenomena, is a case of representation, that is, of analog-to-digital conversion.
PART III uses the model of inquiry developed in PART I to interpret the process by which we come
to articulate meanings for ourselves; the discussion concludes with new interpretations of three
classical theories of inquiry: Platonic and Hegelian dialectic, and Kantian analysis.
PART IV proposes that much of what we take to be human consciousness consists in the inquiry
implicit in the "dialogue of the soul with itself." The logical duality in reciprocal correction now
manifests itself as a duality of conversational partners in inner speech--our "two minds."