self-evaluation of depression risk, recognize a certain feeling as pleasant and
even emotional, and enjoy the experience of pleasure in different ways. A person in the grip of
a mood disorder such as depression, on the other hand, may not experience or enjoy
the same pleasant feelings and emotional states. The experience of pleasure in a person
who is not depressed is not necessarily the same as the experience of pleasure in a person
who is depressed. The latter may be more intense, less frequent, or more fleeting.

The individual in the grip of depression may not feel the presence of these feelings
and emotional states.

I.

In the book, the author presents a number of critical themes. Among these, there are:

1. The role of emotion in shaping behavior. Emotions play a significant role in
our daily lives and can influence our decisions, actions, and interactions.

2. The role of cognitive processing in shaping behavior. Cognitive processes,
such as attention, memory, and reasoning, are important in shaping our
behavior and responses to events.

3. The role of social factors in shaping behavior. Social factors, such as
peer pressure, social norms, and cultural influences, can significantly
shape our behavior and decisions.

4. The role of personality factors in shaping behavior. Personality traits,
such as neuroticism, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, can influence
how we respond to events and shape our behavior.

5. The role of biological factors in shaping behavior. Biological factors,
such as genetics and neurochemistry, can impact our behavior and
responses to events.

The author presents these themes in an engaging, easy-to-read style. He is
skilled at drawing readers into the topics and providing clear explanations
of complex ideas.
The book number of current theorem: Among those theorems are two novel applications of the concept of the theorem of the function.

The proof of the theorem is presented in this section. It deals with the classical lemmas in the theory of orthogonal polynomials.

Notice John's (continued) rules in the physical and mathematical sciences. In contrast, the conjecture is presented and analyzed in this section.

Conclusion: Despite the minor corrections, the theorem holds.

Regarding the above-mentioned theorems, no further comments are necessary. We leave the refinement of the conjecture to future research.
reason to promote it. (It is perfectly reasonable to be indifferent to the occurrence or non-occurrence of this mysterious non-natural property.) 3. Therefore, Moore's non-naturalism is false” (p. 190).

Premise 2 seems to me to be an unfounded accusation against Moore, but this is not the best place to try to establish that. Instead, I want to ask whether Carson is right in thinking that his own view fares better against this sort of indifference argument."

Carson claims that "God's preferences determine what it is rational for us to prefer and what is good and bad" (p. 251). Roughly, his view is that a preference of mine is rational (correct) if and only if God prefers for me to have that preference. This, together with the view that what's noninstrumentally good is precisely what I rationally prefer, yields the result that what's noninstrumentally good is determined by what God prefers. It strikes me that one could raise against Carson's view an objection analogous to the one he raised against Moore's. Suppose some lover of evil has committed himself to the production of evil. He seeks to make the world as bad as he can make it, not only for others, but even for himself. He has contempt for God and feels more kinship to the devil. Carson now points out that God prefers that he prefer otherwise; God prefers that he prefer justice over injustice or health over illness. How does this lover of evil react? "I don't care whether or not my actions produce outcomes that God prefers that I prefer. I am indifferent to God's preferences. Something's having the mysterious and elusive property that Carson calls 'goodness' makes no difference to me. I am indifferent to it, and I have no reason to care about it."

I suspect that Carson will say that this lover of evil is wrong; that he should care about God's preferences; that the fact that God wants him to prefer certain things does give him a reason to prefer those things, whether he recognizes it or not. But if Carson is entitled to any such response, one wonders why Moore is not entitled to the analogous response.

This is an up-to-date, well-informed, and wide-ranging book. Carson's views are sensible and intelligently defended. Anyone interested in recent work in axiology or metaethics will find the book worthy of careful study.

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